

PROXY VOTING POLICY

Considered proxy voting strengthens our ability to be engaged, active owners of companies on behalf of our clients. It helps us to promote effective corporate governance and the prioritisation of long-term shareholder value creation.

Voting complements our engagement with leadership teams by allowing us to express our views on specific issues, and to contribute to initiating change when required to protect and promote the best interests of our clients.

It is, in our view, a key lever in our ability to be effective stewards of shareholder capital. For these reasons, we have a strong preference for being given full discretionary voting authority by our clients.

We carefully consider management's views when determining how to vote at shareholder meetings but our decision is always subject to our assessment of the likely client impact.

While we aim to vote at every shareholder meeting and on every resolution, this is on a 'best endeavours' basis and may not always be possible. Instances where we might not be able to vote include, but are not limited to, when the client has directed stock lending, power of attorney is not in place, we did not receive the ballot from the custodian or it is a restricted market. As proxy voting can be an effective feedback mechanism, when voting against management recommendations we typically notify the company in question, outlining our rationale for the decision.

To ensure that we have all the necessary information on an Annual General Meeting or Extraordinary General Meeting, we receive documentation on forthcoming votes from custodians and receive meeting analysis from an external proxy voting advisory service. We consider third party recommendations for information purposes but arrive at voting decisions independently, based on company meeting materials and, where required, engagement with the company for additional information.

1. REVIEW & MONITORING OF PROXY VOTING

Voting is overseen by the Walter Scott Investment Stewardship Committee (ISC) and all votes are signed off by one of the Chair or Vice Chair of that Committee, Head of Investment Operations and Sustainability, Co-Head of Research, Head of Research Operations or in their absence a Director of Walter Scott. The ISC reviews all proxy voting decisions formally on a quarterly basis.

The ISC will conclude our approach to voting on items that are not expressly covered in our policy or where further guidance has been requested by a member of the Research Team.

Contentious issues or sensitive items are also referred to the ISC for a final voting decision. The Research Operations team is responsible for managing the proxy voting process. The team works with the investment managers and analysts to ensure voting is consistent and aligned with our approach.

2. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Potential conflicts of interest may arise when we exercise our discretionary proxy voting authority on behalf of clients. For example, several of our clients are corporate-sponsored pension schemes associated with companies in which we invest.

Walter Scott as a firm, or senior employees of the firm, could potentially have business or personal relationships with companies or stakeholders involved with the proxies that we are voting. This could be, for example, the issuer, proxy solicitor or a shareholder activist.

This is not an exhaustive list and we may encounter additional conflicts when exercising our discretionary proxy voting authority. We have designed our Proxy Voting Policy and pre-established voting procedures to ensure that only the interests of our clients influence our voting decisions. In the event of a potential conflict, the matter is referred to the ISC to confirm whether the voting position in question is consistent with the Proxy Voting Policy.

If the ISC determines that a vote cannot be made consistent with the Proxy Voting Policy due to an actual or perceived conflict of interest e.g. if the proxy proposal is not addressed by our pre-established voting guidelines or the conflict is too great, the committee will not approve voting. Instead, it will consider options deemed necessary and appropriate to manage the conflict and act in the best interests of clients including, but not limited to, seeking voting direction or consent from clients.

3. VOTING GUIDELINES

While we consider all votes on a case-by-case basis, we have guidelines in place for specific issues. If an investment manager or analyst chooses not to follow these guidelines, they must explain the rationale and submit their recommendation to the ISC for review.

4. BOARDS & DIRECTORS

4.1 BOARD COMPOSITION

We expect boards to be comprised of individuals who collectively bring a range of skills, external experience, support and challenge to the boardroom. We generally prefer to see an independent chair of the board and / or an independent lead director (with the authority to convene the independent directors when appropriate).

We generally presume directors are not independent if they have served on the board for ten or more years and we do not consider representatives of shareholders or former company executives to be independent.

Whilst corporate governance standards and expectations vary between regions, we typically expect a minimum of 50% of independent directors on the board for non-controlled companies. Controlled companies should generally seek to link board independence levels to the economic stake held by minority shareholders. We may engage with companies in the first instance where independence is in question. If a company is unable to justify the apparent lack of independence, we may vote against the election of directors whose appointment would cause independence to fall below the above standards, and / or against the chair of the board where we have material concerns.

We will consider supporting resolutions aimed at increasing board diversity if these are in the best long-term interests of shareholders. Whilst corporate governance standards and expectations vary between regions, we generally expect to see diversity on boards and may engage with companies where this is not the case.

4.2 BOARD COMMITTEES

Where there are separate committees to oversee remuneration, audit, nomination

and other topics, we may vote against chairs or members where we have concerns about independence, skills, commitment or the matters overseen by the committee. Our preference is for 100% independent audit committees wherever feasible. For non-controlled companies, we typically expect to see a minimum of 50% of independent directors on remuneration, audit and nominations committees and an independent committee chair. Where this standard is not met, we may engage in the first instance, but should that prove ineffective we may vote against non-independent committee members, the chair of the nominations committee and / or the chair of the board or take any other voting action deemed to be appropriate.

4.3 DIRECTOR COMMITMENT & ATTENDANCE

When voting on directorships, we give consideration to other commitments and the extent to which these might compromise the director's ability to carry out their responsibilities. If we believe a director is not fully committed to their role, we will typically seek to engage with the company in the first instance. If a director persistently fails to attend board and / or committee meetings without a satisfactory explanation, we will consider voting against the re-election of that individual or against the chair of the nominations committee and / or the chair of the board if deemed to be appropriate.

4.4 CLASSIFIED / STAGGERED BOARDS & VOTING STANDARDS

We generally support declassification of boards and simple majority voting (as opposed to cumulative voting) for director elections. The provision for annual director election by shareholders is, in our view, typically in the best long-term interests of clients.

5. AUDIT

The selection of an external auditor should ideally be subject to annual shareholder approval. There should be transparency in advance of an audit tender so that shareholders can engage with the company in relation to the process should they wish to do so. It

is our preference that the audit firm should be periodically changed. If this is not expected market practice in the relevant region where the company is headquartered, then we would expect that the lead audit partner be rotated periodically or we may vote against the re-election of the external auditor and / or vote against the chair of the audit committee.

We further expect that there is an appropriate balance between audit and non-audit fees paid to the respective audit firm and will generally vote against the re-election of the external auditor and / or the chair of the audit committee if the non-audit fees exceed 50% of total fees payable in a calendar year without reasonable explanation.

6. REMUNERATION

6.1 DISCLOSURE

Remuneration disclosure should be transparent and understandable, facilitating comparability and accountability. We will typically vote against remuneration disclosure that fails to meet these standards.

6.2 EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION

It is our preference for executive remuneration to be designed to align the interests of management and directors with long-term shareholders and durable value creation. We generally vote in favour of compensation plans that we consider to be clear, robust and proportionate. We will consider voting against proposals that appear permissive or excessive within the context of relevant sector and market practices, and with respect to any company specific circumstances.

We have a preference for an annual vote on executive compensation. This helps to ensure ongoing alignment between management's remuneration and the interests of shareholders.

6.3 NON-EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION

The board as a whole should determine levels of pay for non-executive directors and the non-executive chair in such a

manner as to ensure alignment with shareholders' interests, taking independent advice where appropriate to encourage objectivity. Performance-based pay or share options should not typically be granted to non-executive directors and non-executive chairs. We may vote against compensation plans that fail to meet these standards or alternatively consider voting against the chair of the remuneration committee and / or the chair of the board if deemed to be appropriate.

6.4 EMPLOYEE STOCK PURCHASE PLANS

We typically support employee stock plans that align with the interests of shareholders and are appropriate in quantum. We may vote against employee stock plans that fail to meet these standards or alternatively consider voting against the chair of the remuneration committee if deemed to be appropriate.

7. CHANGES TO CAPITAL STRUCTURE

7.1 RAISING EQUITY

We tend to vote against proposals that allow management to raise equity if the potential dilution* exceeds 10% and no specific reason for the capital increase is given. If a specific reason is given, then we will evaluate each proposal on its merits.

7.2 PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS

We generally vote against proposals to waive shareholders' pre-emptive rights to participate in a capital increase if the potential dilution* exceeds 10%. We may accept waiving of pre-emptive rights in certain situations such as the creation of shares to pay for acquisitions or to reward staff and will evaluate each proposal on its merits.

7.3 SHARE REPURCHASES & REISSUANCE

We will typically approve proposals asking for permission to repurchase shares. Furthermore, we will generally vote for proposals to authorise the reissuance of previously repurchased shares as long as the potential dilution* is less than 10%.

7.4 TAKEOVER PROTECTION

We will generally vote against anti-takeover proposals or other 'poison pill' arrangements which can provide undue protection to entrenched management teams, including the authority to grant shares for such purposes.

8. PROTECTION OF SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS

8.1 VOTING STRUCTURES

Our preference is for a 'one share, one vote' voting structure for ordinary or common shares. We discourage any divergence from this approach that gives certain shareholders influence or control disproportionate to their economic interests. In the event that such voting structures already exist, we encourage disclosure and explanation and favour the use of 'sunset' mechanisms. We further encourage commensurate extra protections for minority shareholders (particularly in the event of a takeover bid) and have a strong preference for controlling shareholders to recuse themselves from votes where there is a potential conflict of interest or advisory votes where it would be beneficial to determine the view of minority investors.

8.2 RELATED-PARTY TRANSACTIONS

We consider management's guidance on related-party transactions and we will vote in favour if the resolution aligns with the long-term best interests of shareholders.

9. MISCELLANEOUS

9.1 ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS AND DISCLOSURE EXPECTATIONS

We have a preference that company Annual Report and Accounts and proxy voting materials are available in English.

9.2 ALLOCATION OF INCOME & DIVIDENDS

We may consider voting against proposals where the dividend allocation is below what we consider to be appropriate and the company retains significant cash on its balance sheet without adequate explanation. We may vote against proposals if a company has not specified the dividend allocation.

9.3 VAGUE OR POORLY DEFINED PROPOSALS

Where proposals are vague or poorly defined, we generally seek clarification from the company. If this is not forthcoming, we may vote against the proposal.

9.4 POLITICAL DONATIONS

We generally oppose proposals asking for permission to make political donations. In certain markets (such as the UK) where there is a legal requirement to seek pre-approval from shareholders for all political donations, we will typically support proportionate requests that are designed to protect the company against inadvertent or unauthorised donations. In these circumstances we expect the company to clearly state in their notice of meeting that they do not intend to make any political donations and to have appropriate policies in place to manage the risk of inadvertent or unauthorised political donations.

9.5 PLEDGING OF SHARES

We generally discourage the pledging of stock by management and directors of investee companies.

9.6 BUNDLED RESOLUTIONS

We review bundled resolutions on a case-by-case basis and encourage unbundling.

9.7 ESG ISSUES AND SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS

We consider ESG-related resolutions and shareholder proposals, including those relating to climate risk, on a case-by-case basis, taking account of management recommendation. We will generally vote in favour of shareholder proposals that encourage companies to enhance their understanding and management of material sustainability risks and opportunities, and which are in the long-term interests of shareholders.

9.8 AD-HOC ITEMS

We generally vote against proposals requesting approval for ad-hoc items.

*Potential dilution is calculated as (authorised shares less outstanding shares) / outstanding share count.

10. PROXY VOTING DISCLOSURE

We publish aggregate annual voting data on our website alongside quarterly resolution level data. Our annual Sustainability report also includes aggregate quarterly voting data.

11. OWNERSHIP & REVIEW

This policy is owned by Walter Scott's Investment Management Committee and is reviewed on an annual basis.

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